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IN THE. SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----------~-----~-----------------------------------------~------~-~----

FRANK R GEORGE doing business as
r-RANK GEORGE AND SONS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent

)
)
)
)

)
)

vs

)

OREN LIMITED AND ASSOCIATES,
a Utah partnership,

Case No. 18359

')
I

)
)

Defendant-Appellant

)

PETITION FOR REHEARING
--~---------~---------------------~-~--~-------~-------~----------------

APPEAL FROM A JURY VERDICT ANO JUDGMENT
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
The Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge
----------------------~---------~~--~~-----------~---~--------~---~-----

STEPHEN G HOMER
P. 0. Box 493
West Jordan, Utah 84084
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

LORIN N PACE
Cannon, Hansen & Wilkinson
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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'!HE SUPREME ClXJRT

OF

'lHE

FRANK R. GEXR;E, dba
GEORGE & SCN CDNS'IRUCTION,
Plaintiff-Respondent

STATE OF UTAH

••
••

:

Case No.

18359

-vs-

CREN LIMI'IED & ASSOCIATES,
a Partnership,
Defendant-Appellant

••
••

••

BRIEF IN OPPa3ITICN 'ID

REHEAR.Ill;

PACE, KLIMI', WUNDERLI & PARSOOS
By Lorin N. Pace
1200 University Club Building
136 Fast South Tenple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
S'lEffiEN G. HOMER

P.O. Box 483
West Jordan, Utah 84084
Attorney for

Plainti~f-Respondent
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'!HE SUPREME CDURT

OF '!HE STATE OF UTAH

FRANK R. GOOR;E, dba
GEDRGE & SOO CDNS'IRUCTION,

••
••

Plaintif f-Resp:>ndent

••

-vsOREN LIMITED & ASSOCIATES,
A Partnership,

rn

18359

.•
.•

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF

case No.

••

OPPQSITIOO 'ID PETITION FOR REHEARTIK;

STATEMENT'

OF THE NATURE

OF

THE C'A5E

'!his is Plaintiff-Respondents Petition for a Rehearing fran a decision
of this Court reversing a Jury Verdict and Judgment in the Second Judicial
District Court, In and For Davis Cotmty, the Honorable calvin Gould, Judge,
against Defendant-Appellant.

UTAH SUPREME CDURT DID NZI' MISCDNSrRUE THE FACT'S OF THE
CASE OR MISINI'ERPRET APPLICABLE LAW.

THE

Plaintiff-Resp:>ndent in his Menorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Petition for Rehearing raises the arguments that this Court either
grossly misconstrued the facts of the case or misinterpreted the applicable
lawsJ in as far as Defendant in the lCMer Court was required to raise the
licensing statute as an Affirmative Defense, or that the applicable licensing
statute does not protect the Defendant.
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'lhese arguments are incorrect, as a canparison of August 29, 1983,
opinion with Plaintiff's arguments clearly revealed.

Further Plaintiff

misinterprets the public policy reasons behind the licensing statute and the
protections it is designed to afford.
In a somewhat convoluted argument Plaintiff appears to wish to convince
this Court that adequate protection and safeguards existed to insure the
quality of Plaintiff's work so that the Utah Licensing Statute, Section
58-23-1 Utah Code Annotated, is nugatory.

This is clearly wrong, also the

opinion language clearly indicates that the Court was aware of what protections other than that statute were afforded the parties and considered them
in overruling the Lo.ver Court decision.

See for example p:tragrath 2 of the

. Opinion, p:tge 1, stating that the improvements were inspected by the city.
Although Plaintiff controverts the statement that the improvements were
designed by Farmington he states himself on p:ige 5 of his Brief that the
design is not critical to the protection issue, in other words the matter
which the licensing statute is designed to protect.
Although footnote 9 does seem to create an inconsistency as to whether
or not the city engineer inspected the work, the body of the Opinion itself
acknowledges the fact as urged by the Plaintiff that the city did perform
regular inspections upon the labor.

HCMever the Court finds that inadequate

to fulfill the public policy reasons behind the licensing statute.

The Court

also faults Plaintiff for his willful disregard of that statute and the Court
is lDlWilling to shift the burden of the protection contemplated by the statute
to the inspector

~ay

fran the contractor.

(See i:ages 6 and 7 of the

Opinion.)
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Court in distinguishing Fillmore Products v. Western Paving, Inc. ,
Utah 1977, 591 P.2d 687 and Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979), fran
the instant case clearly grasps the factual situation but choses to limit the
holding of those two cases which established exceptions to the general rule.
The Court in tage 5 of its Opinion cites Lignell to shCM that a litigant is
not a member of the protected class if he can obtain the required protection
through another means, but then goes on to interpret the facts of this case
to establish that another means was not available.

For all of Plaintiff's

arguments of econanic hardship or in equity, ignores the simple fact that all
of these problems could have been avoided had he simply chosen to comply with
the licensing statute and not chosen instead to attempt to make his
. ineffective statement against the "bureaucracy".

rrhe arguments that this

Court made distinguishing the incident case from Lignell and Fillmore
shCM that it must have had a workable grasp of the facts.

Plaintiff next

attempts to convince this Court that the lack of a license is an Affirmative
Defense which must have been plead by the Defendant at the time of trial.

In

making this assertion he canpletely ignores the holding Meridian Corp. y.
MC!2lynn cardwaker Coopany

, 567 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977), the Court in that

case stated "this Court has held that the contracts of unlicensed contractors
are void"

supra p:ige 1110.

Further that case cites Smith v. American

Packing & Provision Co. , 102 Utah 351, 130 P.2d 951 (1942), stating that it
necessary for the Plaintiff to allege that he had the license in order to
state a cause of action.

In other words license is a necessary element of

Plaintiff's action it is not an Affirmative Defense.

Plaintiff had no

standing therefore this Court was correct in its dismissal of his cause of
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action.

In addition in the case of Cheny v. Rucker , 14 Utah 2d 205 V 81

P.2d 86 (Utah 1963), establishes the standard in Utah that prejudice is
necessary before a Court will rule that the other party failed to plead an
Affirmative Defense.

In the present case Plaintiff could not have been

prejudice by Defendant's failure to plead the Affirmative Defense because he
had no standing to be in Court in the first place.

The Plaintiff also

attempts to argue licensing statute in.question does not really afford any
protection to the Defendant.

This argument completely ignores the fact that

the statute has been ruled on over and over again by this Court in the cases
cited in

A~llants

original Brief and in this Court's Opinion that the

purpose of the statute is to insure the protection of the public.
7

of the August 29th Opinion.)

Thus

(See

page

Plaintiff's arguments on page 2 and 3 of

his Brief that the judicial form allCMs Defendant adequate protection is in
opposite, as Plaintiff has failed to prove or shav that Defendant was even
unprotected.
Products ,

As

the Court states in page 3 of its Opinion citing Fillmore

supra , "the p:irty who does not obtain a license, but is required

to do so, can not obtain relief to enforce terms of his contract."

THIS CASE OOES WI' MEE1'I' THE UTAH STANDARD OF RE.VIEW FOR REHEARilN

Utah

Law

dictates that no rehearing will be granted when nothing new or

important is offered for consideration.
11P618;

Ducheneau v. House

Jones v. House , 4 Utah 484, 11P619.

, 4 Utah 483,

In the incident case Plaintiff

has not offered any new facts for the consideration of this Court.

He is

once again merely urging his particular interpretation of the old facts
previously viewed by this Court.
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In the case of CUmnings v. Nielson , 4 Utah 157, 129P619, the Utah
Supreme Court cited the follooing four reasons justifying applying for a
rehearing.
1. That the Court had misconstrued or overlooked sane material fact or
facts.
2.

'!bat the Court had overlooked a statute or decision

3.

'!bat the Court had based the decision on a wrong principle of law

4.

The Court had either misapplied or overlooked something which

materially affected the result.
In reading through the Opinion it can not be reasonably said that any of
these reasons apply.

The Court is aware of all of the facts in our action

with the licensing statute, applied the

pro~r

legal principles and it is

apparent fran the language and the depth of the Opinion is conversant with
all of the facts.

Finally, Plaintiff's contention that he should be able to

" a
recover the pipe would not only lead to econanic waste in this case.I but as
new point first brought up to the supreme Court's attention on this
application for hearing,even though it was
hearing,'Ehus it can not be considered.

available on the origional

see Harrison v. Harker , 44 u.541

142P, 716, further the language of the case is,

supra , indicate that not

just the contract is void and unenforceable if no license but that "no cause
of action is stated unless a licensed is alleged." See Smith and Meridian
Corporation , supra.

The language that the contractor can not recover

payment should be construed brcA1ly, particularly

struction contract where

there is no reason to distinguish between the labor and materials.

More

mportantly of the Briefs already on record and fran the facts given in the
1
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Opinion it is obvious that the Plaintiff has been paid large sums already.
He is now asking the Court to go back and determine ho.v much of those funds,
if any, paid for the pipes alone, what percentage or hCM many of the pipes
could be removed etc., this is contrary to opinions indicating that either
the rule applies and there is no canpensation or that the exceptions apply
and the contractor recovers.
recovery off the contract.

'there is no middle grotmd allCMing for a
This is particularly true when the Plaintiff has

already been paid some sums.

cnJCWSION

'lbere is no real indication that the Supreme Court misconstrued the
facts of the case or misapplied the applicable principles of law.

'!he

holding of a contractors license is a necessary requirement for the Plaintiff
to state a cause of action.

'Ibis Court's holding that no such license was

held effectively bars the Plaintiff fran any recovery for either services or
materials provided, especially when he has already received large sums of
money sufficient to pay him for his pip:s.

The arguments that the licensing

statutes sole purpose is to protect the Defendant in this case ignores the
public policy arguments of protecting the public in general and the
contractors failure to be properly relicensed has been appropriately
sanctioned by this Court by dismissing this cause of action.

Plaintiff's

Brief does not raise any points sufficient to allCM a revie.w or rehearing
before this Court.

The recovery of the

pi~s

at this point is econanic wasteJ

is an issue raised for the first time on appeal or on this
be considered by this Court.

rehearing~ not
I\

Defendant therefore respectfully requests that
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the suprene Court reaffirm its opinion previously entered in this case.
Respectfully subnitted this

~ day of October,

1983.

PACE,
BY
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
OREN LTD. & ASSOCIATES
1200 University Club Building
136 Fast south Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Q)RTIFICATE OF MAIL:tro

I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief on
Appeal to cotmsel for Plaintiff-Respondent:

G. HOMER
Attorney at Law
S'IE:mEN

P.O. Box 483
West Jordan, Utah

postage prepaid this

84084

&ft_ day of October, 1983.
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